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convictions, and if this is at the time defendant is being tried it
must be filed at this time or the prosecuting attorney will be
barred. In all cases if the prior convictions are not discovered by
the time D is released from prison, prosecution under the habitual
criminal act is barred. Of course if the defendant is convicted
again, the habitual criminal act could be used against him. This
would give the state an additional period of time while D is a
prisoner to discover his prior criminal record. With modern police
techniques and complete records of criminal convictions, this should
not impose too great a burden on the state.
John Payne Scherer

Trusts-Limitations on Distributions from
Incompetent's Estate
The trustee of an incompetent sought authority, as provided by
statute, to make certain charitable contributions and gifts from
the income and principal of his ward's estate. Held, permission
granted. The evidence permitted the court to reach the factual
conclusion that the action to be taken was such that the incompetent
if capable would have done the same. In the Matter of Trusteeship
of Kenan, 138 S.E.2d 547 (N.C. 1964).
Before discussing the issues that arise concerning the distributions
from the surplus of an incompetent's estate a more detailed examination of the history and problem involved in the principal case
is required. In 1955 Mrs. Kenan, age seventy-nine, a widow with
no dependents or descendants, had an estate worth approximately
52,000,000 dollars. In that year she executed a will making charitable bequests totaling about 800,000 dollars. She provided other
relatively small legacies for certain relatives and servants with the
residue going to two nephews. In 1962 Mrs. Kenan was declared
incompetent and one of the nephews was appointed her trustee.
In 1963 the North Carolina Legislature passed certain enabling
acts, codified as N.C. GEN. STAT. § 35-29.1 to 35-29.16 (Michie Supp.
1963), which provide that the trustee of an incompetent's estate
may, with court approval and if certain conditions are met, make
gifts from income and principal to tax exempt institutions and to
the incompetent's devisees and heirs.
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Proceedings were instituted in 1963 to make certain gifts and
donations from the estate. Permission was denied, in In re Trusteeship of Kenan, 261 N.C. 1, 134 S.E.2d 85, 91, on the grounds that,
"A court may authorize a fiduciary to make a gift of a part of the
estate of an incompetent only on a finding, on a preponderance of
the evidence,... that the lunatic, if of sound mind, would make
the gift." However, leave was granted to amend the petitions to
allege that the authority sought was for something Mrs. Kenan
would do if competent.
The value of the estate was approximately 128,000,000 dollars
and under the plan approved in the principal case 1,000,000 dollars
would be donated from current income to charities and 23,000,000
dollars from principal would be given to charities and to certain
relatives named in the will. As a result of estate tax savings there
would be a substantial increase in the residue of the estate to be
received by the legatees.
From 1956 to 1962 Mrs. Kenan's charitable gifts bad averaged
8,000 dollars per year. The largest gift made by her in the past
twenty-five years had been 25,000 dollars. In no year had she
given in excess of 50,000 dollars. It is obvious that the incompetent
had not shown a great inclination toward making charitable donations before her incapacity.
The earlier cases on this subject were concerned with allowances
to needy dependents or relatives of the incompetent. Only recently
has the question of tax savings through estate planning entered the
picture. In every circumstance the first requirement has been that
the action taken can in no way jeopardize the well-being of the
ward or completely dissipate the estate. The likelihood of either
occuring when the estate is as large as that in the principal case is
minute.
The spiritual ancestor of all cases in this area is, Ex parte Whitebead, 2 Mer. 99, 35 Eng. Rep. 878 (1816), in which the court
granted an allowance to a niece of a lunatic, stating that it was
not because the party was the next of kin of the lunatic, or had any
right to an allowance, but because the court would not refuse to do
for the lunatic's benefit that which it is probable he would have
done himself had he the capacity to act. At this time the Chancellor's authority over an incompetent's property was governed by
the Statute De Praerogitiva Regis, 1326, 17 Edw. 2. which pro-
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vided the lands and tenements of lunatics should be kept without
waste and destruction and that the lunatic and his household should
be competently maintained with the profits.
This case has been said to stand for the so-called "substitutionof-judgment" doctrine, in that the court is less concerned with what
the particular individual would have done had his mind remained
sound than what an average person in like circumstances would do.
This liberal view has been followed in allowing a pension to an old
servant of the insane person upon his retirement, In re Earl of
Carysfort, Cr. & Ph. 76, 41 Eng. Rpt. 418 (1840), and to discharge a
moral obligation of the incompetent treated as a debt of honor,
In re Whitaker, 42 Ch. D. 119 (1889). In In re Strickland, 6 Ch.
App. 225 (1871), the court granted leave to make a donation of
250 pounds toward building a school and a like amount toward the
construction of a church in the neighborhood of property owned
by the lunatic, citing Ex parte Whitebead as authority. Neither
building had been planned before the incapacity of the ward so
that it could hardly have been argued that it was something the
individual himself could have intended to do.
In other instances English courts have used a narrow construction
of their authority, saying the court should not "deal benevolently"
with the surplus income. In the case of In re Darling,39 Ch. D. 208
(1888), the court refused to make an allowance to needy cousins
of the incompetent, who were also his next of kin, because of insufficient evidence that the incompetent would have made such
an allowance.
29 HALsBuRy's LAws oF ENGLAND, Persons Mentally Disordered
Par. 1052 (3d Ed. 1960), states that the modern English practice
is to exercise reasonable generosity in making such allowances out
of surplus income particularly when, as a result of the income tax
laws, the benefit to the relative is much greater than the net cost
to the estate.
In the United States the courts may be divided into two classes:
(1) those which view their power over the estates of incompetents
as strictly limited by statute and which tend to construe such statutes narrowly against an allowance and (2) those courts giving a
broad interpretation to their authority and what they consider the
best interests of the estate.
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In, Binney v. Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. 43 R.I. 222, 110
Ad. 615 (1920), the court refused to order the conservator of an
estate to continue making payments for the upkeep of property
of which the incompetent was the life tenant but which was and
bad been in the possession of her husband's nephew. In so holding
the court stated that the state statute empowered them to pay the
incompetent's debts and the expenses of supporting him and his
family and to make sales when necessary, but that it failed to
confer any discretion to grant or continue donations which the incompetent was not obligated to make or continue.
A leading New York case in this area, In re Flagler,248 N.Y. 415,
162 N.E. 471 (1928), granted a relatively small allowance to the
second cousin of the incompetent, holding the court's power to
dispose of the incompetent's income was not plenary and that the
court could only give such weight to moral or charitable considerations as it found the incompetent would have given them. Similar
language was used in Kemp v. Arnold, 234 Mo. 154, 113 S.W.2d
143 (1938), where provisions for the incompetent's elderly widowed
mother were authorized, the court indicating that only if they were
convinced from all the facts that the incompetent if sane would
wish to assume such obligation would the court approve it.
In Lewis v. Moody, 149 Tenn. 687, 261 S.W. 673, (1924), it was
held that the authority of a court of chancery over the estate of an
incompetent was purely statutory and that they were not authorized
to make appropriations to persons other than the children and
descendants of the incompetent. This statute was amended in 1927
(remaining basically the same today), TENN. CoDE ANNo. § 34-501
(Supp. 1964), to allow payments for the support of other named
relatives including brothers and sisters if they were dependent on
the incompetent for support prior to his disability, "or are at the
time of the application.., actually dependent, and have a legal
or moral right to claim support from the incompetent were he in
full possession of his faculties." The Tennessee court in interpreting
this section in Mounds v. Dugger, 176 Tenn. 550, 144 S.W.2d 761
(1940), refused to make an allowance to brothers and sisters of
the incompetent saying that it was still necessary for the court
to do only those acts which the incompetent if sane would do, since
for the court to satisfy a naked moral obligation would violate the
incompetent's right to due process under the 14th Amendment as
well as under the Tennessee Constitution. The first Kenan case,
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supra, relied upon the holding and reasoning of the Tennessee court
in refusing to grant the trustee's original request. The dissenting
opinion in the principal case is based upon the rationale that although many people testified that they would advise the incompetent to do these particular acts if she were still sane, the fact remained that she had never shown any great inclination to behave
as the majority said they were now convinced she would.
The broader approach is represented by In re Buckley's Estate,
330 Mich. 102, 47 N.W.2d 33 (1951), in which the court in making allowances to the incompetent's brothers and sisters said that
the term "family" as used in the statute was to be broadly interpreted and that provision could be made for such collateral relatives
upon the theory that the insane person would in all probability have
made the payments had he been of sound mind.
In Sheneman v. Manning, 152 Kan. 780, 107 P.2d 741 (1941),
the court granted an allowance to the indigent adult daughter of
the incompetent, who was also his only heir, even though prior
to his insanity the father refused to allow the daughter in his home.
The court stated that what a normal father ought to do and
probably would do under the circumstances should be the proper
attitude for the father's guardian to take when the father was
unable to act for himself.
Two recent cases have been concerned with the possible tax
savings that can be achieved if distributions are made from the
estate prior to the incompetent's death. The earlier case, Bullock's
Estate, 10 Pa. D.&C.2d 682 (1956), found the court refusing to
make an allowance for tax avoidance purposes on the basis that
the Pennsylvania law did not authorize such a distribution nor
did the court have any implied powers to make it. The court went
on to say that incompetency was not the equivalent of death nor
was tax avoidance a sufficient legal ground for making such a
distribution.
The later case reached the opposite view. In re DuPont, 194 A.2d
309 (Del. 1963). As in the principal case, a sizeable estate was
involved and there was no contention of need on the part of the
children and grandchildren, who were to be the distributees, the
tax saving being the only concern. The court allowed the gifts
on the basis of the resulting tax saving since the remaining estate
would be more than enough to care for the incompetent's needs,
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and the court was satisfied that the plan was one the incompetent
himself would probably have instituted had he been capable.
The court stated that, DEL. CODE ANNO. § 12-3705 (Supp. 1964),
which provides, "A trustee may in the name of the mentally ill
person do whatever is necessary for the preservation and increase
of his estate", along with the usual statute concerning making
distributions to the relatives of the incompetent, empowered the
trustee to invoke the so-called substitution-of-judgment doctrine.
It should be noted that prior cases have looked only to statutes
which give authority to make distributions to certain named parties.
Delaware seems to have been the first to use a statute concerning
the preservation and increase of the estate as a basis. It is reasonable to assume, particularly when large estates are involved and
there is no need on the part of the distributees, that other courts
may use this theory when tax savings are the reason the distribution is desired.
In the first Kenan case the court refused to accept a liberal
substitution-of-judgment rule, even though the legislature had provided, N. C. GEN. STAT. § 35-29.3 (Michie Supp. 1963). The court
stated in the first case that, "The judge shall not withhold his
approval merely because the incompetent prior to becoming incompetent, had not made gifts to the same donee or other gifts
similar in amount or type"-the court still adhering to the principle
that the action to be taken must be something that the particular
incompetent would do in order to avoid depriving the incompetent
of property without due process.
In theory the North Carolina court gives a strict construction to
its authority to allow a distribution; however, in view of the evidence deemed sufficient, in the principal case, to prove that this
action was something Mrs. Kenan would do if able. North Carolina
is more nearly in accord with those jurisdictions which look to what
an average person would do under the circumstances and not
necessarily the particular incompetent.
One of the major objections raised by the dissenting opinion in
the principal case was that the decision was an open invitation
for expectant heirs, devisees, and organized charities, dissatisfied
with the method of distribution set up by the incompetent, to seek
changes on the theory of this case. Abuses could well result if
the courts fail to use the utmost caution in this area.
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The powers and duties of an incompetent's committee in West
Virginia are set out in W. VA. CODE ch. 27, art. 11, § 4 (Michie 1961),
which provides, "He shall preserve such estate and manage it to
the best advantage; shall apply the personal estate . . . to the
maintenance of such person, and his family, if any; . . ." The
West Virginia court has stated that the powers conferred by this
statute are broad, McDonald v. Jarvis, 64 W. Va. 62, 60 S.E. 990
(1908), and that the management of the estate is transferred for
preservation and wise expenditure as may be most beneficial to
the incompetent owner. Gapp v. Gapp, 126 W. Va. 874, 30 S.E.2d
530 (1944).
Apparently the question of making expenditures for other than
support payments to the incompetent or his family has not arisen
in West Virginia. However, in view of the statute's broad language,
a West Virginia court might well sanction the substitution-ofjudgement doctrine to the point of making distributions for tax
avoidance purposes, if of course, it is something a reasonable
person would do under the circumstances and it is clearly shown
that the recovery of the incompetent is unlikely and that his comfort and well being will not be endangered.
David GailHanlon

Wills-Equitable Conversion
T, who owned two farms, entered into a specifically enforceable
contract to sell farm number one. Later, he executed a will in
which he devised his personal property to A, a life estate in the
farms to A, and the "balance" in the farms to B. At T's death the
contract was unperformed but still specifically enforceable. A
contends that T's rights under the contract to sell the farm passed
with T's personal property. B contends that T's rights under the
contract to sell the farm passed under the specific devise of the
farms. The issue presented was whether a devise of land in which
the testator has naked legal title sufficient to pass his personal,
equitable interest in that land. Held: yes, a general or specific
devise passes the interest of the testator in the land which he had
contracted to sell prior to the execution of the will. The fact that
the testator was mistaken as to the legal nature of his interest in
the land will not be allowed to defeat his intent to give the benefit
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